Building machines that learn and think about morality by Burr, Christopher & Keeling, Geoff
Building machines that learn and think about morality
Christopher Burr 1 and Geoff Keeling 2
Abstract. Lake et al. [30] propose three criteria which, they argue,
will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cogni-
tive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these crite-
ria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral
reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to
the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on
the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and
model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We also discuss
how work in embodied and situated cognition could provide a valu-
able perspective on future research.
1 Introduction
Following recent theoretical developments in deep learning, re-
searchers have started to consider how these technologies could be
leveraged to help us understand the workings of the human mind
(e.g. [51]). In a recent Behavioural and Brain Sciences article [30],
however, Lake et al. argue that “despite rapid progress in AI tech-
nologies over the last few years, machine systems are still not close
to achieving human-like learning and thought.” Furthermore, they
state that scaling-up current systems, or utilising more data, will not
be sufficient to achieve human-like learning in AI, because funda-
mental ingredients of human cognition are currently missing. In this
paper, we explore the proposal put forward by Lake et al.3, focusing
on a specific component of mind and intelligence they do not con-
sider directly: our capacity for moral reasoning.
Our capacity for moral reasoning is influenced by the technolo-
gies we use. It will be further shaped by ongoing technological
developments, such as those discussed by Lake et al. Therefore,
building machines that “learn and think” like humans, as Lake et
al. propose, raises important questions about the nature of moral-
ity and our capacity for moral reasoning. For example, how will
our moral decision-making and deliberation be impacted when con-
ducted alongside artificial moral agents? And, what directions should
we pursue and avoid when designing artificial agents that learn and
think (like humans) about morality? We discuss some of these ques-
tions, and look at possible research directions that we believe should
be critically discussed by both philosophers and those directly en-
gaged with the research and design of AI technologies.
Despite being speculative in nature, our article avoids consider-
ing extreme possible future scenarios (e.g. superintelligence), such
as those made famous by the works of philosophers such as Nick
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Bostrom [3]. We believe many of the most important ethical chal-
lenges surrounding AI and morality are already upon us, and require
careful interdisciplinary cooperation if we are to avoid the foresee-
able quagmires inherent in our current and future moral landscapes.
This is important to note, for it is far easier to construct a thought ex-
periment concerning a distant future moral scenario than it is to plan
for the way that AI will actually evolve. We believe there is good
reason to focus on the present and the immediate future, and to take
seriously proposals such as the one defended by Lake et al., as it is
research such as this that gives us the clearest indication of what the
future may have in store for us.4
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the main
claims defended by Lake et al., specifically their emphasis on the use
of causal models in generalisable learning, and the distinction be-
tween model-free and model-based methods of learning. We briefly
mention how these topics are to be connected to the discussion of
moral reasoning. In section 3, we briefly discuss what aspect of moral
reasoning we focus on, and give examples from the area of moral
psychology to illustrate. We also connect this section’s discussion to
the distinction drawn in section 2, and explain why it is relevant to
the prospect of building machines that learn and think about morality.
In section 4, we introduce a more philosophical consideration about
the representational requirements of internal model-building, and ask
whether the proposal defended by Lake et al. could be further devel-
oped by considering work in situated and embodied cognition. We
conclude, in section 5, by outlining a number of ethical issues that
arise at the intersection of artificial intelligence and morality.
2 Building machines that learn and think like
people
In their Behavioural and Brain Sciences target article [30], Lake et
al. outline a research strategy, which they believe will help engineers
to develop machines that “learn and think like humans”. Their strat-
egy focuses on three non-exhaustive5, but core ingredients of human
intelligence:
1. An ability to learn and build causal models of the world to support
explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern
recognition problems.
2. Grounding this learning in intuitive theories of physics and psy-
chology to support and enrich the knowledge that is acquired.
3. Harnessing compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly ac-
quire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations.
4 Nevertheless, we believe there is significant value in work such as
Bostrom’s. We simply choose not to adopt this strategy ourselves.
5 In their author’s response, Lake et al. acknowledge that many other facul-
ties may also be required to enable machines to fully think and learn like
humans, including emotions, embodiment and action, social learning and
interaction, open-ended learning, and intrinsic motivation.
To demonstrate the importance of these ingredients they discuss
two recent examples of state-of-the-art deep learning systems (see
[29, 33]), which are trained on two separate tasks (i.e. handwrit-
ten character recognition and generation, and learning to play video
games), but drastically differ from humans in terms of key perfor-
mance indicators (e.g. poor transfer of domain-general knowledge;
long training periods and large datasets). Lake et al. argue that cur-
rent dominant approaches in machine learning are too entrenched in
pattern recognition approaches, and fail to harness more human-like
methods of learning, in order to transfer acquired knowledge to new
domains. For example, they state:
“A deep learning system trained on many video games may
not, by itself, be enough to learn new games as quickly as
people. Yet, if such a system aims to learn compositionally
structured causal models of each game—built on a foundation
of intuitive physics and psychology—it could transfer knowl-
edge more efficiently and thereby learn new games much more
quickly.” (p. 18)
This idea reflects an assumption made by the authors that “the dif-
ference between pattern recognition and model building [...] is cen-
tral to our view of human intelligence”. As an example, they consider
a video game called ‘Frostbite’. This video game is notoriously hard
for a typical deep learning (pattern recognition) system to learn [33],
due to the need for long-term planning and complex hierarchically-
structured goals (e.g. acquiring a series of items before a reward is
offered). Even more recent versions of deep Q-networks, which even-
tually outperform a human player, require hundreds of in-game hours
to achieve such performance. In contrast, most human players can
achieve reasonable levels of performance in a matter of minutes. Fur-
thermore, Lake et al. state that, once learned, a human player would
be able to transfer prior knowledge about the game’s causal struc-
ture to novel scenarios (e.g. novel game mechanics such as “Get
the lowest possible score”, or “Die as quickly as you can”) very
quickly. Importantly, these novel scenarios would represent drastic
departures from the initial rewards learned from prior experience,
and thus represent difficult hurdles for many deep learning systems
designed through standard reinforcement learning techniques. Lake
et al. argue that the knowledge transfer humans display likely relies
on the existence of a constructed internal model, which represents
a generalisable causal structure about the game’s mechanics, and is
leveraged by inductive biases inherent in human learning (so called
“start-up software”)6.
In spite of the strong emphasis on model-based learning, Lake et
al. also discuss model-free methods of learning. In reinforcement
learning, a model of the environment is an optional element in an
agent’s control policy, where the policy is alone sufficient for de-
termining behaviour [44]. Therefore, some artificial agents can act
on the basis of model-free algorithms that directly learn a control
policy without needing to build a model of their environment (i.e. re-
ward and state transition distributions). However, such agents would
require a model in order to undertake more complex forms of reason-
ing, such as long-term planning. As is well known in artificial intel-
ligence, building a model of the environment can be costly and time-
consuming, but as the above example highlights, model-free meth-
ods are inflexible outside of highly controlled domains, making them
6 Lake et al. acknowledge that human learning has itself been shaped by
millions of years of evolution, which could be seen as our own “training
period”. However, this point merely reinforces their argument for develop-
ing a similar type of “start-up software” for artificial agents, which natural
selection has developed for humans.
poor candidates for generalisable learning and knowledge transfer.
Therefore, as Lake et al. argue, an agent that could make use of ei-
ther cooperative or competitive mechanisms for switching between
model-free and model-based forms of learning (see [12]), would ap-
pear to have an advantage over less flexible agents. Such an agent
would also be closer to achieving more human-like forms of learning,
as existing research suggests humans are capable of utilising both
model-based and model-free methods of learning (e.g. [17, 38]).
This flexible switching between model-free and model-based
forms of reasoning and learning is important for understanding how
the above proposal connects to moral reasoning. In section 3, we
will explore the application of dual-process theories of judgement
and decision-making (e.g. [27]) to accounts of moral reasoning (e.g.
[19, 47]). These theories claim that in addition to relying on delib-
erative, model-based forms of reasoning, human agents also rely on
model-free heuristics that allow the agent to trade-off accuracy for
speed, while potentially selecting value-enhancing actions in con-
strained environments [16]. Dual-process theories are ubiquitous
in the sciences of human decision-making (e.g. behavioural eco-
nomics), and are also common in evolutionary psychology where
they are deployed as possible adaptationist explanations for a wide-
range of observed behaviours in humans and primates [49, 14]. Prior
to this discussion, however, it is important to address a theoretical
assumption.
The perspective that Lake et al. adopt is explicitly computational
in nature—that is, intelligent behaviour can be causally explained by
appealing to a series of algorithmic processes that the agent’s cog-
nitive system realises [37].7 However, Lake et al. also acknowledge,
that this is unlikely to be sufficient to capture all forms of human
intelligence:
“Other human cognitive abilities remain difficult to under-
stand computationally, including creativity, common sense, and
general-purpose reasoning.” (p.3)
In section 4, we will discuss a possible research avenue, inspired
by work in social cognition and embodied robotics, which argues
for the importance of cognitive scaffolds and niche-construction in
supporting adaptive behaviour. We will argue that one possible hur-
dle that computational approaches could face, may arise with an im-
plicit commitment to a methodological individualism, which views
the brain’s mechanisms as the primary system to be explained (in
computational terms) when we wish to understand an agent’s be-
haviour (see [9] for discussion). It is unclear to what extent Lake
et al. are committed to a methodological individualism8, and so our
proposal is intended as a friendly suggestion that we believe is in the
spirit of their account.
In contrast to the kind of methodological individualism that char-
acterised classical cognitivist approaches to mind and behaviour, re-
cent work in ‘4e cognition’9 argues that some forms of human (and
non-human) intelligence arise from an agent’s engagement with its
material environment (e.g. [32]) and embeddedness within its socio-
7 Although we believe it is also worth considering whether moral reasoning
could be better explained in non-computational terms, we restrict ourselves
in this paper to considering research that is most directly relevant to the
computational approach being discussed.
8 For example, in their author’s response, Lake et al. state that their intention
was to remain agnostic about possible implementations for how models
should be learned (see section R5.2 in [30]).
9 ‘4e cognition’ refers to work that fits within the research programmes of
embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition. It does not repre-
sent a unified research programme itself.
cultural niche (e.g. [2]).10 The engagement between an agent and its
environment can include the leveraging of physical structures (in-
cluding the agent’s own body) to reduce the computational demand
that a given task places on the agent’s cognitive system (e.g. re-
ordering ingredients in a recipe, in order to reduce the demands on
an agent’s memory), but can also extend to normative constraints that
are embedded within social institutions (e.g. language, legal struc-
tures, social norms). These normative constraints may themselves
provide readily accessible alternatives to the costly construction of
an internal model (e.g. using emotional feedback from peers as an
approximate indication of whether your actions are socially accept-
able).
In the following sections, we expand on each of the above points,
which we believe offer fruitful ways of thinking about how to build
artificial systems that could be capable of rudimentary forms of
moral reasoning, or perhaps better support existing forms of human
moral reasoning (e.g. “human-in-the-loop”). However, before we dis-
cuss these features, it is worthwhile stating what we mean by ‘moral
reasoning’.
3 What Is ‘Moral Reasoning’?
When we ask what would be required for an AI to think and learn
about morality, we must be clear about the kind of moral reasoning
in question. There are, at least, three kinds of cognitive process which
might reasonably be classed as ‘moral reasoning’. In this section, we
distinguish these different kind of moral reasoning, and make clear
which of these is under consideration.
First, moral reasoning might be understood as the kind of reason-
ing demanded by the correct normative ethical theory (e.g. if utili-
tarianism is the correct theory, then moral reasoning is reasoning in
accordance with utilitarianism). Second, moral reasoning might be
characterised as a form of deliberation which requires us to adopt an
impartial perspective. That is, moral reasoning requires us to con-
sider the interests of a suitable reference class of moral patients, as
opposed to just our own interests [41, 23]. Finally, according to a
third, so-called descriptive view, moral reasoning might be under-
stood as reasoning which involves moral concepts, such as fairness,
duty, blame and responsibility. The focus of this third view is how
humans do reason about morality, as opposed to how they ought to
reason. As Lake at el. are primarily concerned with what is required
to bring AI closer to human cognition, we focus on this third view.
The descriptive view involves a commitment to two claims. The
first is that our moral concepts are built around innate tendencies to
evaluate certain features of our environment [43, 26]. These evalu-
ative tendencies admit evolutionary explanations. For example, take
the disposition to evaluate characteristically unfair situations as bad.
Plausibly, natural selection favoured genes promoting emotional dis-
positions against unfair situations, as these dispositions serve an im-
portant regulatory function that allows organisms to reap the bene-
fits of prosocial behaviour. It is, therefore, no surprise that other pri-
mates have negative emotional responses to characteristically unfair
situations [5, 6]. The second commitment involves the role of folk-
psychological concepts in our moral reasoning. Guglielmo, Monroe
and Malle [20], for example, have argued that many of our most im-
portant moral concepts are grounded in folk-psychology. Our con-
cept of blame, for example, relies on our seeing the recipients of
blame as agents capable of intentional action, foreseeing conse-
10 In some cases, the account that is offered rejects a computational perspec-
tive, in favour of a more dynamical approach (e.g. [8]).
quences, and so on. Joshua Knobe [28] defends a related thesis, ac-
cording to which our moral concepts are central to how we under-
stand intentional action. This commitment connects up with the first
of the two insights from Lake et al., and we take it to be a posi-
tive feature of their argument that they acknowledge the relevance
of grounding causal models in intuitive theories of folk-psychology
in human cognition, insofar as this may help to capture important
features of our moral reasoning. However, the types of models that
Lake et al. emphasise are richly-structured generative models, which
work by trying to reconstruct the hidden causal structure of a tar-
get domain (e.g. perception), and it is unclear to what extent this
theory-like model-building is a necessary of our capacity for moral
reasoning.
As alluded to in section 2, Lake et al. deal with this worry by ref-
erence to a key debate in reinforcement learning: the extent to which
an intelligent agent relies on model-free or model-based methods of
learning and decision-making. They acknowledge that some task do-
mains are best approached using model-based methods of cognition
(e.g. deliberative planning), whereas others seem to require model-
free methods (e.g. skillful or habitual motor activity), and that some
recent proposals in artificial intelligence and computational neuro-
science use a combination of the two (e.g. [38, 48, 34]). The extent
to which a particular task requires model-based or model-free meth-
ods of cognition is likely a matter of degree, and may require some
sort of arbitration mechanism to alter the extent to which the two
forms interact (see [10]). Regardless, neuroscientific evidence sup-
ports the idea that human learning comprises both model-free and
model-based methods [17, 11]. How does this matter for moral rea-
soning?
If our moral concepts are grounded in our folk psychology, as
Guglielmo, Monroe and Malle [20] argue, then one way of under-
standing the model-based versus model-free distinction, is as a guide
to when our moral reasoning relies most heavily on deliberative or
habitual processes11. Joshua Greene (e.g. [19, 18]) argues that moral
reasoning involves an interplay between affective or ‘quick-fire’ cog-
nitive processes and our deliberative cognitive processes, and this as-
pect of our morality may be nicely captured by the second insight
from Lake et al. (i.e. an interplay between model-free and model-
based learning). In his [18], Greene found empirical evidence show-
ing that the way in which a moral dilemma is presented to us influ-
ences our deliberation about that dilemma. For example, in trolley
cases, we are inclined to kill the one to save five if doing so in-
volves causing the harm ‘remotely’ (e.g. pulling a leaver). But in
cases which involve ‘up close and personal harm’ we are liable to
have a negative emotional response which biases our deliberations in
favour of letting the five die so that we avoid inflicting harm on the
one.
This interplay can help us overcome some of the worst effects of
using heuristic (or model-free) based forms of reasoning. As is well
known, heuristics are often adaptive only in narrow domains [16],
and there is some reason to think that heuristics make us worsemoral
reasoners outside of these constraints. Greene [18] and Peter Singer
[40] have argued that the role of heuristics in moral reasoning causes
us to be sensitive to morally irrelevant features of decision problems.
For example, we are moved to help individuals suffering nearby to
11 As already alluded to, it is likely that the extent to which certain forms
of reasoning and learning are best described as “model-free” or “model-
based” is a matter of degree. Therefore, it is ill advised to assume that the
traditional dichotomies between habit and reason, or heuristics and delib-
eration, map neatly onto the distinction between model-free and model-
based.
us, but not on the other side of the world, yet, according to Singer
[40], the location of an individual is irrelevant to whether we ought
to help them. In light of this, the proposal of Lake et al. to develop
artificial systems that are able to adaptively deploy both model-free
and model-based forms of learning and reasoning appears sensible in
light of this worry.
In this section, we distinguished three different accounts of moral
reasoning and specified the account which we intend to focus on. The
descriptive accounts of moral cognition found in moral psychology
will be the object of our inquiry. In what follows, we explore how
model-free and model-based forms of learning, alongside embodied
and situated cognition, can elucidate what it would mean for an AI
to think and learn about morality.
4 The world as its “own best model”
In his [4], Rodney Brooks, offered a criticism of what he termed the
‘sense-model-plan-act’ (SMPA) model of artificial intelligence. The
idea that Brooks wished to challenge was that if an AI (or a robot)
was a) required to gather information from its environment (sensing),
in order to b) build a richly reconstructive representation (model),
with which to c) formulate a plan of reaching some desired goal-
state (plan), before d) carrying out the necessary movements (ac-
tion), then outside of a carefully designed and controlled laboratory
setting (i.e. a narrow domain), such a serial process would be insuffi-
ciently dynamic to cope with the pressures of a constantly changing
environment. In the time taken to deliberate, the environment may
have changed, rendering the current model (and any actions based
on it) inaccurate, and thus raising the agent’s uncertainty. Utilising
the SMPA model in ecologically-valid scenarios would mean either
the artificial agent would incur an accuracy cost (subject to the en-
vironment changing), or it would incur a drastic speed cost. Instead,
Brooks’ suggestion was to implement a more straightforward senso-
rimotor coupling approach (based on his subsumption architecture),
where the internal models were replaced with a more direct sensi-
tivity to the environment, and the environment directly elicited and
constrained adaptive behaviour with no need for mediating represen-
tations.
Since this time, greater consideration has been paid to the speed-
accuracy trade-off, and the distinction between model-free/model-
based methods has evolved to a point where many researchers now
acknowledge the importance of some type of arbitration mechanism
between the two methods (e.g. [10, 12]), rather than accepting a strict
dichotomy. However, as some of the commentators to the Lake et al.
target article argued, more attention still needs to be given to more
ecologically-valid forms of intelligence that rely on the agent’s situ-
atedness or embodiment (e.g. [1, 35]). In short, if the body or envi-
ronment of the agent enables the agent to offload some of the compu-
tational complexity, then there may be no need for the agent to con-
struct a detailed inner model of the environment in the first place—in
Brook’s own words, “The world is its own best model.” (1991, p.
15). This idea is reflected in work in developmental psychology [46]
and soft robotics [36], and, in some cases, represents an instance of
what Robert Wilson [50] refers to as ‘wide computationalism’. It is
also a familiar research area discussed in the ‘extended mind’ liter-
ature. In this section, we extend some of these considerations to the
issue of moral reasoning—an area that is often underexplored in the
4e cognition literature.
One way of understanding the embodied and situated cognition
research programmes, when applied to moral reasoning, is in un-
covering the myriad ways that our environment (including our bod-
ies) shapes and constrains the way we learn and reason about the
world. Our environment represents an irreducible source of uncer-
tainty and complex hierarchically-structured causes (e.g. what con-
sequences will my actions have on other agents worthy of moral con-
sideration), and our brains have clearly evolved heuristics and biases
in order to simplify some of this complexity [16]. In acknowledging
this, embodied and situated cognition researchers point to the way
that social interaction allows us to cooperatively shape our sociocul-
tural niche (e.g. [42]), and possibly make the world more predictable
by constructing a more reliable domain in which our heuristics can
operate (i.e. intervening on the world to reduce uncertainty). More
recently, researchers in the area of normative folk psychology, have
presented evidence for how certain sociocultural norms (including
morality) are constructed through social interactions, and in turn con-
tribute to our understanding of our own behaviour [52]. The benefit
of constructing a stable, normatively structured environment is not
only that it helps to regulate behaviour, but also that it provides a way
of offloading some of the computational demands of cognition onto
the environment itself. Acknowledging when this is possible (and
desirable) could help AI researchers determine when artificial sys-
tems need to rely on model-based methods, or when the world can
stand-in as “it’s own best model”. In the case of morality, by paying
attention to the structure of the environment, engineers can deter-
mine if some normative structure is already present, and whether it
is better to simply couple an agent’s actions to the world as a sort
of distributed form of moral behaviour. To better make sense of this,
consider the following example.
H. L. A. Hart [24] provides an account of what distinguishes soci-
eties with a legal system from societies without a legal system. Ac-
cording to Hart, a set of norms becomes a legal system when ‘sec-
ondary legislation’ is enacted which stipulates the conditions under
which a rule ought to be recognised as law. For example, the con-
stitution of a state will specify which individuals are permitted to
enact valid laws. If Hart’s view is correct, then the development of
secondary legislation could plausibly be construed as an instance of
cognitive offloading with respect to moral cognition. Secondary leg-
islation provides individuals in a society with a prima facie reason
to behave in accordance with primary legislation, even if they do not
understand the argument behind the primary legislation. Put another
way, once secondary legislation is introduced, individuals have rea-
son to comply with certain imperatives because it is the law. Thus,
the existence of secondary legislation provides an external constraint
on our legal (and often moral) behaviour, which does not require us
to evaluate whether or not there is good reason to comply with the
constraint.
The above example should highlight that a moral agent is not re-
quired to internalise the norms of society in order to ensure their
behaviour meets certain moral standards, and can potentially make
do with a simplified model of the world (or maybe even a set of
well-tuned heuristics) when certain institutions act as regulative con-
straints. Of course, delineating the causal factors that govern an
agent’s behaviour is understandably a complex task. However, it is
important to realise when an agent may be able to behave optimally
(e.g. morally) simply by utilising adaptive heuristics, which respond
to simple cues in the environment, rather than by constructing a rich
inner model that acts as the basis for deliberative decision-making.
This is not to deny that human agents are capable of norm internal-
isation, but the extent to which our moral behaviour is a product of
constrained heuristics, rather than model-based deliberation is un-
clear. For example, it is possible that we achieve a high degree of
moral optimality by using model-based reasoning (perhaps imple-
mented by mechanisms in prefrontal cortex) to competitively con-
strain the more heuristic based forms of action selection that drive
our moral behaviour. However, it is also likely that society has col-
lectively shaped our shared sociocultural niche, in order to reduce the
demands placed on individuals, while nevertheless promoting opti-
mal decisions.
An important question remains, why should we design artifi-
cial agents that rely on (potentially maladaptive) heuristic decision-
making, like humans, when there is the possibility of pursuing more
rational methods. Is there an answer, short of avoiding computation-
ally demanding model-building, that can be offered?
5 Further Remarks
We conclude, by briefly considering whether the development of AI
systems that are capable of human-like moral reasoning is a desirable
goal. Our aim is not to argue exhaustively in favour of either posi-
tions, but rather to provide a sketch of the related ethical challenges
that arise at the intersection of artificial intelligence and morality. We
begin with the negatives.
5.1 Why artificial morality may be undesirable
(1) The Ideal Reasoner Concern: It might be the case that AIs which
reason morally as we do are more inclined to make suboptimal moral
decisions. As aforementioned, heuristics sometimes make us sensi-
tive to morally irrelevant features of decision problems. So, if our
intention is to develop AIs which make the best possible moral de-
cisions, then we might have stronger reasons to focus on building
ideal moral reasoners, as opposed to AIs which replicate our non-
ideal moral reasoning. But, in order to design an ideal moral agent,
we need to have a clear picture of what an ideal moral agent looks
like [25, 3]. There are at least two problems here. On the one hand,
there are several plausible ethical theories on the market, and moral
philosophers are yet to provide decisive reason to favour one of these
theories. Moral philosophers have only recently started to consider
the rational response to ‘normative uncertainty’, providing decision-
theoretic accounts of how to adjudicate between moral theories when
we are unsure which, if any, is correct [31]. So, it is unclear at present
which moral principles we have best reason to implement when de-
signing an ideal moral agent. On the other hand, it is often the case
that apparently plausible moral principles give surprising results in
novel situations. Indeed, a substantial amount of ethical theorising
involves testing how different principles square with our intuitions in
novel cases. Whilst a set of moral principles might seem ‘ideal’ in
one setting, they can easily be non-ideal in another. So, in develop-
ing AIs as ‘ideal’ moral reasoners, it is plausible that the principles
used might deliver unforeseen and counterintuitive results, which is
something we have good reason to be cautious about [3].
(2) The Bias Concern: Jonathan Haidt [22] notes the importance
of in-group/out-group biases in our moral decision making.12 Plausi-
12 Note that there are three kinds of bias that present ethical issues in the
context of AI decision-making: (1) We sometimes claim that a dataset is
biased. When bias is a property of datasets, we mean that the sample data
does not accurately represent the population. This kind of bias can present
ethical issues with respect to, at least, training data for Artificial Neu-
ral Networks (ANNs). For example, an ANN used for voice recognition
might be trained on a dataset of voices in which minority accents are in-
sufficiently represented. (2) Other times we claim that a decision-making
process is biased. For example, an ANN which is trained on biased data
might produce skewed classifications. (3) Yet more times, we say that a
decision-maker has a bias which is part of the agents cognitive apparatus.
For example, an agent could have in-group/out-group bias as a component
bly, whilst this bias may have an important functional role in human
moral reasoning, there is good reason not to include biases of this
kind in our AIs. The problem is that there exists a gap between how
humans in fact reason morally given the available cognitive mecha-
nisms, and how humans ought to reason morally. This gives rise to
a trade-off. On the one hand, designing AIs to reason about moral-
ity as humans do will make AIs susceptible to the kinds of moral
mistakes that humans routinely make. Human moral reasoning is im-
perfect, at least insofar as our cognitive mechanisms have inbuilt
biases which dispose us to factor in morally irrelevant information
into our decision-making. On the other hand, designing AIs to rea-
son morally in a way that is too far removed from ordinary human
reasoning will most likely result in AIs with inflexible moral reason-
ing that is unsuitable for general use across a broad class of moral
decision-problems.
There are some biases in human cognition which would provide
no straightforward benefit to AI moral reasoning if analogous biases
were implemented into AIs. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of these
biases is unlikely to be problematic. Consider ego depletion. Accord-
ing to what is called the strength model, humans have a capacity for
self-control which enables them to engage in goal-directed behaviour
and to resist impulses. However, this capacity is limited: prolonged
activity involving self-control diminishes our capacity to resist im-
pulses [21]. Although ego depletion no doubt plays a role in human
moral decision-making, which is a taxing exercise requiring consid-
erable self-control, there are good reasons not to include an analo-
gous bias when developing AIs to reason morally. There is no clear
benefit to having AIs which are in some way worse at making moral
decisions after a prolonged period of moral decision-making. And
it is desirable that AI moral reasoning is consistent over time. (This
is especially important with respect to AIs making decisions which
affect human wellbeing, such as AIs used to aid decision-making in
criminal justice.) In our view, biases like ego depletion ought not
to be considered as necessary for constructing an AI which reasons
about morality, even though human moral reasoning is no doubt af-
flicted by this cognitive limitation.
We have examined two concerns about the desirability of AIs
which have the capacity for moral reasoning. In the next section, we
discuss two desirable features of AIs capable of moral reasoning.
5.2 Why artificial morality may be desirable
(3) The Transparency Concern: With regards to positive reasons
for pursuing artificial morality, we first consider the issue of trans-
parency in current deep learning systems [7]. The transparency con-
cern relates to artificial decision-making systems that process infor-
mation using methods that are opaque to most people affected by
the AI’s decision. It is, therefore, difficult to provide an explanation
of how the AI reached its decision. Explanations are an important
component of how we engage with other moral agents in society. In-
deed, some moral theorists, such as T.M. Scanlon [39], argue that
what makes actions morally right or wrong is whether those actions
are mandated by principles which are justifiable to the parties af-
fected by those principles. On this view, reasons take centre stage, as
we justify our moral behaviour by appealing to reasons. In principle,
the issue of transparency could be resolved if we develop AIs whose
moral reasoning is grounded in folk-psychological mechanisms sim-
ilar to our own moral reasoning. As Jonathan Haidt [22] and others
have noted, when we attempt to justify our moral behaviour, these
of their cognitive apparatus.
justifications involve folk-psychological concepts such as intention,
belief and reasonable foresight of consequences. In bringing AIs in
line with our mechanisms for moral reasoning, plausibly, this will
open the possibility of AIs who can themselves offer moral justifi-
cations for decisions which are intelligible to those affected by the
AI’s decision. Importantly, as Daniel Dennett [13] notes in the case
of the Intentional Stance, these types of explanations need make no
reference to the underlying mechanisms that ground an agent’s be-
haviour (e.g. the pattern of neural activity that causes an agent’s ac-
tions), which is important given the inherent opacity of (black-box)
deep learning systems. Explanations that are couched in terms of in-
tentional psychological states (e.g. beliefs, desires etc.) play a sim-
plifying role, which can also have a regulative effect on our future
behaviour, and are typically sufficient to justify moral behaviour. For
example, we are presumably happy for someone to justify their be-
haviour by virtue of appeal to folk psychological states, rather than
a more complex explanation that makes reference to neural states13.
Building artificial agents whose learning is grounded in intuitive folk
psychological theories, as Lake et al. propose, seems a sensible first
step in working towards artificial intelligence more understandable
to humans.
(4) The Envelope Concern: Secondly, and finally, building artifi-
cial systems that can (co)operate within our own system of moral
values is important, as we ideally want to avoid developing intelli-
gent systems that are misaligned with our own moral principles. Re-
search in situated and embodied cognition may represent a valuable
avenue to explore in this regard, allowing us to develop autonomous
decision-making systems that cooperate with us and help us over-
come some of the limitations of our own moral reasoning. Luciano
Floridi’s [15] notion of an ‘envelope’ is a helpful conceptual tool to
understand this point. He states, “In robotics, an envelope is the three-
dimensional space that defines the boundaries that a robot can reach.
We have been enveloping the world for decades without fully real-
ising it.” Here, the problem is that by “enveloping our world” such
that it is easier for artificial agents to operate within it, we end up
restructuring our own environment in ways that may have problem-
atic consequences for us. We do not want our environment (includ-
ing ourselves) re-structured to fit the ontology and values of artificial
agents that may have conflicting goals or morals. In short, we want to
design artificial agents that can (co)operate within our own envelope,
not change our environment to fit theirs. Of course, the process will
likely be a matter of reciprocal development (e.g. encoding knowl-
edge systems in a AI-friendly manner; re-designing roads to accom-
modate autonomous vehicles), and humans are able to adapt to new
situations thanks to our ability to learn generalisable knowledge. Pur-
suing artificial agents that “learn and think” more like us, however,
may help make the process more conducive to human flourishing.
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